Going by the
theories propounded by economists and planners in the 1970s, at the time of its
independence Pakistan was to be considered at the take-off stage of economic development.
Besides a formidable administrative machinery, the western part of the country had
inherited a fine network of roads, railways, canals and educational institutions. It was
in possession of state-of-the-art irrigation technology. It had a huge workshop at Lahore
to maintain the railways rolling stock; a very big bridge workshop at Jhelum, and three
ship repair workshops at Karachi. These workshops were manned by thousands of highly
skilled workers. Besides, there were a large number of engineers, experienced in the
design and construction of roads, railways, bridges, canals, dams and barrages. Not only
the country had no foreign debts to repay, it had inherited a respectable ‘Sterling
Balance'. All its technological expertise was ready to be employed for earning foreign
exchange. The capital goods and engineering industry in the private sector, sufficiently
large to have given a helping hand to the British war effort during World War II, could
have been expected to participate in development by exporting machine tools, diesel
engines, electric fans, surgical instruments, cinema projectors etc. Furthermore, food
grains, milk and dairy products, cotton, hides and skins and leather goods could have kept
Pakistani trade in good stead. Law and order was good and there was no undue unemployment.In contrast to Pakistan, the two economic miracles of today - China and South Korea - were two completely ruined countries when they gained independence in the late 1940s. They had not much infrastructure to speak of; and whatever there was had been destroyed by foreign invasion and civil war. The administrative machinery was badly disrupted, and the Chinese interior was under one warlord or the other. It was supposed to take several decades for both countries to develop the basic infrastructure and material and human resources before economic development could start.
In 1997, on the Golden Jubilee of its independence, Pakistan had slid down from the take-off stage to that of underdevelopment, while China and South Korea have become big economic power of the world. Why? What went wrong? This book explores these vital questions and brings out how the privileged ruling classes managed to squander Pakistan's valuable technological inheritance trough their undemocratic and ruinous policies and faulty planing.